Draft: Do not quote from or cite to without authors' permission, comments welcome
 
 
 
WAR AND RECONCILIATION


William J. Long and Peter Brecke
 

Reconciliation and Social Order
 
 

A fundamental political question is how groups of individual actors

maintain social order despite competition and conflict among themselves.

The most important puzzle for social scientists is the explanation for

sociality itself and how it is maintained. 1
 
 

Formal and informal observation of many levels of social

organization acknowledge the tension between aggressive behavior and

societal harmony and point to the importance of reconciliation as integral

to mitigating future violence and maintaining societal relationships.

Consider four descriptions of the role of reconciliation in very different

"societies."
 
 

In primate society, Frans de Waal describes a fight in the

chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo:
 
 

It was the winter of 1975 and the colony was kept indoors. In the

course of a charging display, the dominant male attacked a female, which

caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees came to her defense. When the

group finally calmed down, an unusual silence followed, with nobody moving,

as if the apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony

burst out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the

corner of the hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two chimpanzees

kiss and embrace . . . the embracing individuals had been the same male and

female of the initial fight.2
 
 

In sub-national or tribal relations, a second observation comes

from the seventeenth century letters of author Samuel Sewall. He captured

the following ceremony of native Americans of the northeast colonies in

1680:
 
 

Meeting with the Sachem they came to an agreement and buried two

axes in the ground . . . which ceremony to them is more significant and

binding than all the Articles of Peace, the hatchet being a principle

weapon.3
 
 

In the national society of South Africa today, Archbishop Desmond

Tutu's Truth and Reconciliation Commission collected testimony from the

victims and perpetrators of apartheid. The goal of the Commission, in

Tutu's words, was
 
 

"The promotion of national unity and reconciliation . . . the

healing of a traumatized, divided, wounded, polarized people."4
 
 

In the realm of international politics, contemporary historian

Hendrick Smith described the signing of a peace treaty and the public

joining of hands between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minister

Menachem Begin of Israel, and President Jimmy Carter of the United States:
 
 

The elusive, unprecedented peace treaty that Egypt and Israel

signed today has enormous symbolic importance and the potential for

fundamentally transforming the map and history of the entire region . . .

the best diplomatic estimate here is that the treaty has markedly reduced

the risk of a major war in the Middle East for a considerable time . . .5
 
 

Remarkably, each description contains the implicit or explicit hypothesis

that future violence is less likely to occur, and "societal" order more

likely to be restored, if the parties to a conflict engage in a formal,

public process of reconciliation.
 
 

Is there empirical support for this suggestion, and, if so, how

does reconciliation operate to restore order and affinity in relations? As

international relations scholars, we have investigated the role and reach

of reconciliation between states, to understand its impact in international

society.6
 
 

Reconciliation and Interstate Relations
 
 

Although many disciplines and public perception recognize

reconciliation as a powerful force in reestablishing social order following

conflict, reconciliation's role in international society-restoring amity

between countries following a war or a series of wars-has attracted little

direct attention from international relations scholars. This study

remedies this shortcoming with a methodologically rigorous, comparative

case study examining the role of reconciliation in international relations.
 
 

Initially, we conducted a broad survey that examined the relations between

parties to a reconciliation event. We define a "reconciliation event" as

one that includes the following elements: (1) direct physical contact or

proximity between opponents, usually the senior representatives of the

respective states; (2) a public ceremony accompanied by substantial

publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national

societies; and, (3) ritualistic or symbolic behavior that indicates the

parties consider the dispute resolved and that more amicable relations are

expected to follow. That research indicated that a reconciliation event

between states after a war appears to lead to a measurable improvement in

subsequent bilateral relations.7
 
 

Specifically, our empirical investigation produced eight workable

cases where we can see the results of an international reconciliation:

four cases where a reconciliation event marked a subsequent improvement in

bilateral relations, and four cases where the results show no discernible

improvement. The cases are listed in Table 1 and presented graphically in

Figures 1-8.8
 
 

TABLE 1
 
 

Reconciliation with visual evidence of Reconciliation without visual evidence

subsequent improvement in bilateral of subsequent improvement in bilateral

relations relations

_ USSR - West Germany _ UK - Argentina

_ India - China _ Cambodia - Vietnam

_ Egypt - Israel _ Honduras - El Salvador

_ China - Vietnam _ Poland - West Germany
 
 

As can be seen from the table and figures, this evidence provides

enticing support for the suggestion that reconciliation can, but does not

inevitably, lead to an improvement in relations between former

belligerents. This finding merits further investigation. Our initial

study also provides a set of cases that vary with regard to the dependent

variable of our research-bilateral relations between former belligerents

following a reconciliation.
 
 

[Figures 1-8 here]
 
 

Having found that a reconciliation event marks a change towards

more cooperative and less conflictual bilateral relations between former

belligerents in some cases, this study investigates the following

questions: (1) Under what conditions is reconciliation more or less likely

to achieve a reduction in future conflict; and (2) What is the mechanism by

which reconciliation has this effect? The answers to those questions could

contribute significantly to the literature on international conflict and

its resolution and to rethinking fundamental assumptions underlying much

social theory.
 
 
 
 

Method of Investigation
 
 

Comparative Case Study
 
 

This study builds on these empirical results through a detailed,

theoretically-informed comparative case study analysis that explores the

questions enumerated above. An in-depth study of a small number of cases

provides an opportunity to subtly yet systematically explore those

questions. However, comparative case study analysis also presents certain

methodological challenges. The major challenge, of course, is the problem

of complex, multiple determinants of social phenomenon and the risk of

spurious or invalid inferences being drawn from a few cases where multiple

causal factors may be at play-in short, the problem of "over-determinancy."9
 
 

To control for this problem, the case study investigation is

defined by the systematic use of theory and a within-case process tracing

procedure. Two hypotheses, one drawn from rational choice and game theory

and the second grounded in several behavioral and social sciences and

linked to natural science are used to establish the relevant independent

variables, and within-case process tracing identifies the intervening steps

or cause-and-effect links between the independent variables and the

outcomes. To explore our research questions, we use the above-named eight

cases. As noted, these cases provide a substantial range of outcomes on

the dependent variable (subsequent bilateral relations between former

belligerents) and are relatively free of selection bias.
 
 

Theoretical Framework for Case Analyses
 
 

Despite pervasive references to reconciliation in popular discussions of

intra and international conflicts, the notion that reconciliation is an

important determinant of subsequent relations between states is a powerful

assumption, yet one wholly unexamined in international relations theory.

Those international relations scholars focusing on the systemic level do

not, by definition, recognize reconciliation events-symbolic and purposeful

acts by agents representing states-as important to understanding interstate

relations and interstate conflict.
 
 

Even those analysts who look for the origins of interstate behavior

and conflict in individuals, and from this point of departure draw

inferences to the behavior of groups (such as states), have not directly

considered the role of reconciliation in international relations.

Nonetheless, two different explanations for why reconciliation might reduce

the subsequent level of conflict between former belligerents and lead to an

improvement in bilateral relations can be developed from existing

literature.
 
 

Rational Choice
 
 

The first hypothesis derives from rational choice and game

theoretic approaches to explaining cooperative outcomes. Game theorists

specify possible outcomes from the interaction of rational actors seeking

to "win," i.e., achieve desired strategies and goals. This approach

stresses that the best strategy for breaking a pattern of hostile

interactions is through the sending of signals that provide a measure of

commitment to the pursuit of improved relations. Reconciliation events or

gestures are particularly effective forms of this type of signal because

reconciliation is costly to the participants, and costly signals are more

reliable determinants of a state's true intentions than low-cost or

cost-free signals.10
 
 

Reconciliation events impose costs because of their "audience

effect."11 Leaders do not conduct foreign policy in isolation, but before

domestic and international audiences. Concern with adverse domestic

political reaction to a reconciliation event with a former adversary or

with domestic political humiliation should a leader subsequently decide to

back down from an agreement, or should it fail to produce the intended

effects are important domestic audience costs associated with a

reconciliation. Likewise, risking opprobrium from third states that may

disapprove of the reconciliation or, facing the loss of international

reputation should the party to a reconciliation event retreat from the

agreement or the possibility that it would be exploited by its efforts

impose significant international audience costs associated with a

reconciliation.
 
 

In sum, a reconciliation event is a costly (or potentially costly)

signal that the other party is more likely to interpret as a genuine offer

to improve relations and thus may break a deadlocked conflictual situation.

Because of the associated costs of backing away from the reconciliation, it

may also buttress initial attempts of the parties at cooperative

interaction. Social science, since the work of J. David Singer, has argued

that for one state to perceive another as a threat it must see the latter

as having both the capability and the intent to block the attainment of

one's desired strategies and goals.12 Thus, by making costly (and

therefore trustworthy) signals indicating a less hostile intent,

reconciliation reduces the threat perception between states (other things

being equal) and permits an improvement in relations.
 
 

Therefore, game theory and rational choice theory instructs us to

investigate the case studies for factors that increase or decrease costs to

the parties-domestically and internationally-of participating in a

reconciliation event.13 Factors that increase the costs of a

reconciliation event would presumably enhance the chances for a subsequent

improvement in bilateral relations while those that reduce costs would

reduce the likelihood of reconciliation having a positive impact on dyadic

relations. For example, a reconciliation attempt made despite domestic

opposition would send a stronger signal to a former adversary than one with

little domestic consequence and hence should be more likely to change the

adversary's threat perception. Likewise, factors that clarify or obsfucate

the signal-sending effect of a reconciliation should be important

determinants of its success or failure. The signal-sending hypothesis and

its operationalization are addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.
 
 

Cognitive/Behavioral Assumptions of Rational Choice
 
 

Most works on signaling are consistent with a general rationality

assumption about decision-making. An individual (or an individual acting

on behalf of a collective), chooses an action from an array of potential

actions that maximizers its interest or utility. Donald Green and Ian

Shapiro catalogue the assumptions of general rationality:
 
 

that people always act rationally (according to the specified definition);

that people base their actions on certain types of information, sometimes

"perfect information," that people update their beliefs in accordance with

Bayes' Rule; that people evaluate their options on the basis of values

specified in the theory (usually nonaltruistic values or utility schedules

that exhibit such mathematical properties as transitivity, ordinality,

etc.); that the relevant political "commodities" are homogeneous and

infinitely divisible; and that preferences remain fixed for the duration of

the time frame in question.14
 
 

These assumptions apply with equal force for all persons.
 
 

These assumptions, in turn, rest on a theory of human cognitive

mechanisms that generate this expected behavior. The mind is assumed to be

essentially "content independent"-it takes its cues from the

environment-and "domain general," that is, its rational processes operate

on all domains of human activity. The expected behavior of universal or

general rationality-all individuals always act to maximize their well-being

as they understand it, based on their preferences and strategic

opportunities-and its assumptions about the human mind as a general purpose

calculator, are stringent.
 
 

An Integrated Causal Model
 
 

The second hypothesis is founded on underlying psychological

principles of individual and group behavior and represents a very different

explanation. This approach argues that important social practices like

reconciliation are direct outgrowths or manifestations of deep human

passions or emotions, not merely rational calculations. A general

rationality assumption may fail to fully account for this patterned

behavior. Reconciliation events, instead, can be understood as the

culmination of a particular mental process, a process of forgiveness-the

overcoming certain psychological attitudes (mainly overcoming cycles of

anger, resentment, and vengeance and their accompanying emotions of fear

and guilt). They represent a change of attitude about oneself and toward a

formerly perceived wrongdoer that opens the possibility of new, beneficial

relations. Forgiveness is not the condoning of the former belligerent's

action; it is a revision in judgment of the former belligerent itself. The

parties to a reconciliation come to understand themselves as something

other than those incidents or traits which they do not approve.
 
 

According to this hypothesis, although cognitive judgments and

strategy are involved in the process of reconciliation, the process

fundamentally represents the overcoming of collective emotions and is

assisted by specific problem-solving mechanisms that help us restore

relations in our societal group rather than general rational calculation.

Reconciliation requires: (1) recognition of a wrong; (2) breaking the

cycle of injury through forbearance; (3) regaining confidence in one's own

worth despite the actions (aggression) that may have challenged it and

repudiating emotions of resentment toward the other and seeing the other as

someone other than "the one that hurt me;"15 and, (4) offering a

reestablishment of relations.
 
 

Clearly, the process takes many years to consummate, and where

collectivities are involved, the issue of forgiveness becomes much more

complicated than in the one-on-one model of an injured person and a

wrongdoer.16 Nonetheless, forgiveness and reconciliation have a clear

social function-restoring a neutral or more positive relationship following

a transgression and reestablishing membership or affiliation in a larger

society-and can occur between individuals, between an individual and a

group, or between groups.17 Reconciliation involving groups may have many

unique and problematic dimensions. One complicating factor is that

forgiveness and reconciliation between political collectives is generally

thought to require the active intervention of a principal, an authoritative

deputy who represents the collectivity because, however real and powerful a

collective entity, it cannot speak or act on its own.18
 
 

Such deputies serve not primarily as autonomous individuals, but as

agents or emissaries of a larger group who, by virtue of their

institutional office or position, are both empowered to speak for the many

and circumscribed by collective goals and interests.19 In affecting

reconciliation, the role of such a deputy is less the sincere expression of

personal views and more the public acknowledgment of the conflict, the

promise that similar acts will not be repeated (forsaking revenge), and the

commitment on behalf of the many to the future of the relationship. Still,

"leaders" in articulating and affecting the pattern of inter-group

relations, also have the power to shape the beliefs of the group they

represent as part of an iterated process of change.
 
 

Unlike rational choice, this approach includes a role for emotion,

not just calculation, in understanding human and group motivation and

action. "Emotion," is an term subject to multiple definitions and

connotations, but it is generally thought to include physiological arousal,

sensations of pleasure and/or unpleasure, and ideas or cognitive appraisals

regarding the source of the arousal.20 "Neither the pleasure-unpleasure

sensation nor the idea alone constitute an affect or emotion as a feature

of mental life."21
 
 

Specifically, anger, a much studied emotion, which often leads to

aggression or a desire for revenge, is replaced by a degree of empathy and

a desire for affiliation as evidenced through reconciliation. Although

each of these terms is the topic of much debate in psychology and in other

fields, for our purposes, "anger" can be understood as a strong emotion or

experiential state-ranging from irritation to fury-that occurs in response

to a real or imagined frustration, threat, or injustice whereas

"aggression" is an impulse to hurt as a possible response to anger, and

"revenge" is a more deliberate form of aggression. "Empathy" implies a

realistic understanding resulting from "feeling with" (not for) another and

"affiliation" is a basic human motivation, a desire for belonging with

another, even if only to enhance one's own chances for survival.
 
 

Psychological and Biological Foundations of an Integrated Causal Model
 
 

What "theory of the mind" (motivational assumptions) and behavioral

expectations can account for the forgiveness approach to understanding

reconciliation, an approach that includes an obvious emotive dimension?

Evolutionary psychology22 with its biological foundation offers an

alternative framework for explaining the reconciliation process that

connects social theory with the natural sciences. This approach begins by

assuming that theories of human motivations and behavior must be consistent

with the fact of evolution, the cornerstone of modern biology.
 
 

The approach rests on a different understanding of the human mind

than that of rational choice theory which sees the mind as a general

purpose computer that embodies "rational" decision rules. As noted,

according to rational choice assumptions the same mechanisms and principles

operate regardless of content to address all challenges in one's

environment: "how one acquires a language, how one learns to recognize

emotional expressions, . . . how one acquires ideas and attitudes about

friends and reciprocity-everything but perception."23 With the exception

of certain basic drives like hunger or thirst, the human mind is content

free, not designed to recognize, structure, or solve certain problems

rather than others, but flexible, capable of applying rational rules

equally well, in any domain.
 
 

Work in cognitive psychology, biology, and neuroscience, call this

model of the mind into question. Alternatively, the human mind, like other

organisms, can be understood as an evolved structure that includes a large

collection of functionally-specialized, domain-specific computational

mechanisms. These specific problem solving capabilities, or "circuits" to

use the popular metaphor, are adaptations, constructed by natural selection

and other evolutionary processes over evolutionary time to cope with

regularly occurring, reproductive-threatening problems (so-called

"adaptive" problems). Form followed function.
 
 

According to this view, all normal human minds reliably develop a

collection of functionally-integrated reasoning abilities that interpret

experience by providing frames for understanding events in our environment

such as the actions and intentions of others, that inject motivations, and

that shape behavior. The human mind possesses "privileged hypotheses" or

"crib sheets" about how the world works, a fact that has been documented on

human subjects ranging from infants as young as a few hours old to adults

at every age and in every walk of life. This circuitry, which may embody

rational methods or may have other inference procedures that are not

universally logical, helps humans solve particular problems ranging from

acquiring language, to recognizing faces and emotions, to understanding

physical principles, to diagnosing reciprocity and cheating, faster and

more reliably than a content-free "rational" computation device could

because a general-purpose computer is constrained to apply the same

problem-solving methods to every problem and can make no special

assumptions about the problem to be solved.24 Embedded knowledge about

specific problems allows the mind to "frame" problems in otherwise

incomprehensible world. A frame, akin to a software program in a computer,

"carves the world into defined categories of entities and properties,

defines how these categories are related to each other, suggests operations

that might be performed, defines what goals might be achieved . . ."25
 
 

In short, the human mind has developed reliable, specialized

mechanisms that are pre-equipped to know many things about social

interactions such as exchanges and threats, emotions, language, expression,

among others.26 The flexibility and power displayed by the human mind

results from the large number of specific problem solving capabilities not

from absence of specific content and general rationality.
 
 

This understanding of the human mind can incorporate emotion as

well as rationality because emotions may be products of an evolutionary

process: the results of functional adaptation.27 Specifically, emotions,

it is suggested, solve regulatory problems in a mind filled with

functionally-specialized mechanisms. In ways not yet fully understood,

emotions help coordinate among problem solving techniques and their

appropriate application to situations.28
 
 

As applied to this study, a unified causal explanation suggests

that a ubiquitous, enduring, adaptive problem that humans have encountered

for several million years (since they first lived in groups), is the

problem of sociality-how to restore social order and the benefits of

affiliation despite inevitable conflicts. In response, the often-witnessed

and variously-documented ability to forgive and the process of

reconciliation is, hypothetically, one modern manifestation of a

functionally-specialized human29 problem solving capability that we possess

to explicate ourselves from this recurrent dilemma. Without such a

mechanism, Hannah Arendt supposed, "our capacity to act would, as it were,

be confined to one single deed [conflict] from which we could never

recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not

unlikethe sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the

spell."30

The universality of a problem, like sociality, or the evidence of

ubiquitous problem-solving mechanism, like reconciliation, is not proof of

an evolved human capability, but it does allow for the generating of

hypotheses about social phenomenon and the design of observations and tests

that are plausibly consistent with psychology and biology and otherwise

would not have been thought of. This model of the human mind generates a

different set of predictions about human behavior and decision making than

those of rational choice. In this instance, it can account for the

"forgiveness hypothesis," in distinction to the "signaling hypothesis."
 
 

Procedurally, the method of deriving and examining social science

hypotheses from this integrated causal perspective can begin by noting the

existence of a complexly-articulated and recurrent behavioral trait, in

this case reconciliation events. Second, one can ask, deductively, whether

the trait could reasonably be the expression of an adaptation, that is, a

response to a species typical problem encountered over several million

years of human evolution. If so, we might be witnessing a contemporary

manifestation of an evolutionary engineered problem-solving capability

rather than simply the exercise of general rationality. There may be

latent dimension to human behavior that must be accounted for, not just our

rationalizations. Third, armed with a plausible hypothesis, the posited

behavioral characteristic must be linked with and understood in its

cultural, social, or political system.
 
 

Examining the case studies from this approach would involve a

search for evidence of a change of self-perception or "identity" from one

who was wronged to one of autonomy and equivalence in the bilateral

relationship. Likewise, evidence of a change to a more holistic view of

the other, expressed either rhetorically or in action, could reveal this

phenomenon. Indicia of such changes-what is described as the forgiveness

process in the next chapter-should contribute to a successful

reconciliation attempt.
 
 
 
 

A Closer Look at the Cases
 
 

Up to this point, in-depth studies have been conducted on six of

the eight cases presented earlier in Table 1.31 The six cases provided

evidence in support of the rational choice, interest-based hypothesis. All

of the cases contained signs that the interactions and decision-making

processes up to, as well as subsequent to, the reconciliation event were

essentially driven by calculations of the domestic or international costs

and benefits of pursuing a reconciliation. In most cases there was little

or no evidence of a past or ongoing process of forgiveness. Elements of a

forgiveness process appear in the Egypt-Israel, Poland-West Germany, and

United Kingdom-Argentina cases, but each of these cases is best understood

as an effort to align interests through a signalling process.
 
 

Indeed, two or three of the cases may be "false positives," where

the parties did not meaningfully reconcile. For example, it is unclear

whether the United Kingdom and Argentina have reconciled even though they

reached an agreement to normalize relations in 1990 and the Argentine

President, Carlos Menem, visited London in 1998 and expressed "regret" for

the Malvinas War. Relations remain frosty in many areas such as the

possibility of Argentine visits to the Malvinas/Falkland Islands and

fishing rights in the waters surrounding the islands. On the other hand,

British investment in, and trade with, Argentina has grown markedly since

1990 and is now approaching prewar levels (adjusted for inflation and

economic growth).
 
 

A very different situation, the ostensible reconciliation between

West Germany and Poland in 1970, appears to have been less than fully

voluntary on the part of the Poles. The Warsaw Treaty was apparently a

consequence of the earlier reconciliation between West Germany and the

Soviet Union and subsequent Soviet pressure on the Polish government. The

modest, technical nature of the accords reached by the Polish and West

German governments after the Warsaw Treaty and the stagnation of relations

in the 1980s support this interpretation. Only since 1990, when a

Polish-German treaty established the permanence of the current borders does

it appear that a true reconciliation is occurring.
 
 

A questionable reconciliation also occurred in the El

Salvador-Honduras case. The treaty signed in October 1980 resulted in

large part from pressure applied by the United States government, which was

concerned about Salvadoran rebels using the disputed border zones. Because

of lingering hostilities after the Soccer War, those zones had been

designated demilitarized zones in 1976 and thus were effectively havens for

the rebels. Although some normalization between the former belligerents

occurred-border and diplomatic consular missions were reopened, for

example-both countries remained focused on internal unrest, particularly on

reconciliation within their own societies, and there has been little

attention given to bilateral relations.
 
 

The reader may note that all three of these cases are those from

the right side of Table 1, where a reconciliation event occurred but was

not followed by a subsequent improvement in bilateral relations. At one

level it can be argued that in these cases a reconciliation did not really

occur even though there was a reconciliation event. As such, determining a

causal explanation for the reconciliation becomes moot. Alternatively, one

can accept that a reconciliation occurred but then make two inferences.

The first is that reconciliations vary greatly in their nature and the

degree to which they change (especially improve) relations between the

former belligerents. The second is that these cases support the rational

choice hypothesis rather than the integrated causal hypothesis. The fact

that two of the cases appear to be primarily the result of external

pressure and the third response to economic opportunities (trade and

investment) indicates the countries made "rational choices" to sign

treaties and moderately improve relations without undergoing a fundamental

re-evaluation of themselves and their former opponents and truly attempting

to put the past conflict behind them.
 
 

If we move our focus to the cases in Table 1 in which a

reconciliation appeared to have a positive effect on relations, we find

that two cases, China-India and China-Vietnam, unambigously support the

rational choice hypothesis while the Egypt-Israel case lends modest support

for the integrated causal hypothesis even as it is consistent with the

rational choice explanation. For example, in neither of the two cases

involving China was there a re-evaluation of the opponent or oneself. Nor

was there a discussion or debate within the societies regarding a

reconciliation. Perhaps most importantly, none of the actors perceived

themselves as creating or reconstituting a different relationship between

themselves.
 
 

The Egypt-Israel case differs somewhat from the others. To be

sure, the Israeli and Egyptian leadership, especially Begin and Sadat,

could be considered to be making rational decisions given their

circumstances and signaling their positions and intent as per the

expectations of the rational choice hypothesis. However, this case also

found the actors performing some of the actions expected from the

integrated causal hypothesis. The former belligerents pledged to forego

the option of revenge for past acts. They also attempted to construct a

fundamentally different relationship in which the interaction was not

overtly hostile (even though it could not be considered to be warm or

friendly). More debatable is whether Egypt and Israel underwent a change

in terms of their self-identity and their fundamental recognition of the

other party. It is not evident that Israel experienced significant change,

but it appears that Egypt made a fundamental reevaluation of Israel and its

relationship to Israel. Egypt no longer could formally ignore the

existence of Israel and expect or hope it to disappear through conquest.

Egypt acknowledged that it had acknowledge Israel and establish a more

complete relationship.
 
 
 
 

Conclusions and Implications for Further Research
 
 

What can we conclude about the applicability of the rational choice

and integrated causal hypotheses from this assessment of international

reconciliation? From these cases we must infer that in the international

arena, reconciliation is rare and appears to proceed along, rational

decision making lines. The rational choice hypothesis provides a superior

explanation.
 
 

What does this say about the integrated causal hypothesis? We do

not think this hypothesis has been invalidated by our study. The fact that

elements of it appear in the Egypt-Israel case and more tenuously in other

cases argues for an alternative conclusion. Instead of invalidating the

hypothesis, we believe this study defines the limits of the hypothesis's

scope or purvue. At the international level, which is often described as

an essentially anarchic system, the weakness of the "societal" links and

the lack of adherence to ideas and norms associated with society precludes

interactions appropriate to the integrated causal hypothesis. Given that

the bonds that make up a society are so tenuous at the international level,

the interactions within the international system may be different from

those within states or groups.
 
 

In particular, we expect that the interdependent and enduring

nature-and hence the salience-of relationships between groups within states

may motivate different strategies and behaviors to deal with societal

conflicts. Strategies and behaviors employed by intra-national groups may

in some instances be better explained by the integrated causal hypothesis

as opposed to the rational choice hypothesis.
 
 

Our future work on this project aims to explore that conjecture.

We initiated research that will examine instances of reconciliation between

major social groups within countries to determine whether and when

reconciliations within "true" societies exhibit traits congruent with the

integrated causal hypothesis and the rational signally model.
 
 

1 Pierre L. van denBerghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier,

1981), p. 6.

2 Frans de Waal, Peacemaking Among Primates (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1989), p. 5.

3 Robert Hendrikson, Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins (London:

MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1987), p. 90.

4"How Can Past Sins Be Absolved," World Press Review, February 1997, pp. 6-9.

5 Hendrick Smith, "Treaty Impact Still Unknown," The New York Times, March

17, 1979, p. A1.

6 The notion of international society (or society of states) we take from

Hedley Bull. According to Bull, international society "exists when a group

of states , conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a

society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common

set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings

of common institutions." Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 13.

7 For a complete explanation of how these results were obtained, see Peter

Brecke and William J. Long, "War and Reconciliation," International

Interactions, vol. , no. , Spring 1999, pp. __.

8 The Figures are plots of the interactions between countries for the

period stated in each figure. In the Figures, each dark vertical bar

portrays a measure of the behavior of one country towards another for one

month during the period indicated in the figure. A tall bar indicates a

conflictual month. A short bar indicates a month with relatively less

conflict. A bar that extends below zero indicates a month in which the

cooperative acts outweigh the conflictual acts. A horizontal gap between

vertical bars (except for an extremely narrow gap) indicates a month or

months in which there was no recorded act (or the quite unlikely

possibility that the conflictual acts were precisely counterbalanced by the

cooperative acts). The very long vertical bar demarcates the time of a

reconciliation event. These plots enable us to easily visualize the basic

dynamics of the behavior of one country towards another over a significant

period of time. (On request, the authors can provide a complete discussion

of the methodology used to generate these time series graphs.)

9 The controlled comparative method has certain distinct advantages as

well: The problem of reliability and validity may be smaller than in large

N studies because the analyst has a small number of cases to thoroughly

consider and is less dependent on data s/he cannot properly evaluate.

Arend Lijhart, "The Compable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research,"

Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8, July 1975, pp. 157-77.

10 Tony Armstrong, Breaking the Ice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of

Peace, 1993), pp. 21-24; S.S. Komorita, "Concession-Making and Conflict

Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 17, no. 4, December 1973,

pp. 745-63.

11 James D. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model: The Role of Costly

Signals in Crisis Bargaining," paper presented at the 1990 Annual

Convention of The American Political Science Association, San Francisco,

California, August 30-September 2.

12 J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and National Decision-Makers," in

Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, editors, Theory and Research on the

Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 39-42.

13 Social psychology-the study of intergroup relations including intergroup

conflict and its de-escalation or resolution-has identified several factors

that improve recognition of a reconciliation signal and encourage

reciprocation. Factors that facilitate successful (conflict reducing)

signals between individuals and groups include: costliness; vulnerability;

novelty; voluntariness; and, irrevocability or non-contingency.

14 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 30.

15 Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 34.

16 Joseph W. Elder, "Expanding our Options: The Challenge of Forgiveness,"

in Exploring Forgiveness, p. 161.

17 On this point see Michelle Beth Estrada-Hollenbeck, Forgiving in a World

of Rights and Wrongs, pp. 98-117.

18 Ibid., p. 99. See also Donald W. Shriver, Jr., An Ethic for Enemies, p.

221; Felicidad Oberholzer, The Transformation of Evil, pp. 266, 275-76.

19 Nicolas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, pp. 100-101.

20 Stanley Schachter, "The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological

Determinants of Emotional State," in Advances in Social Psychology, vol. 1,

L. Berkowitz, ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1964).

21 Brenner (1992) cited in Martha A. Gabriel and Gail W. Monaco, "Getting

Even: Clinical Consideration of Adaptive and Maladaptive Vengeance,"

Clinical Social Work Journal, vol. 22, no. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 165-178, at

p. 166.

22 Evolutionary psychology is psychology informed by evolutionary biology.

23 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer,

http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.htm

24 Cosmides and Tooby explain that machines limited to rational procedures

are computationally weak relative to those with particular problem-solving

mechanisms. "The difference between domain-specific methods and

domain-independent ones is akin to the difference between experts and

novices: experts can solve problems faster and more efficiently than

novices because they already know a lot about the problem domain." Leda

Cosmides and John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer, p. 11. Having

no privileged hypotheses, general rationality is quickly overtaken by

"combinatorial explosion." "Combinatorial explosion is the terms for the

fact that with each dimension of potential variation added, or with each

new successive choice in a chain of decisions, the total number of

alternative possibilities faced by a computational system grows with

devastating rapidity."

25 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, "The Psychological Foundations of

Culture," p. 102, p. 166.

26 Ibid., p. 89.

27 See, for example, M.B. Arnold, Emotion and Personality (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1960); The Nature of Emotion (London: Penguin

Books, 1968); I. Eibl-Eibesfelft, Ethology: The Biology of Behavior, 2nd

ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1975).

28 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, "The Psychological Foundations of

Culture," p. 99.

29 The capability to solve the sociality problem through reconciliation is

not necessarily limited to humans. Frans deWaal and Filippo Aureli argue

that following conflict, "nonhuman primates engage in nonaggressive

reunions . . . now widely known as reconciliations." Reconciliation, they

suggest restores valuable relationships disturbed by the conflict.

"Conflict Resolution and Distress Alleviation in Monkeys and Apes," in The

Integrative Neurobiology of Affiliation, C. Sue Carter, Izja Lederhendler,

and Brian Kirkpatrick, eds. (New York: New York Academy of Sciences,

1997), pp. 317-28, at p. 317.

30 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 237.

31 The findings reported in this section are derived in part from research

conducted by graduate students at the Sam Nunn School of International

Affairs. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Joy Bennett,

Wei Ding, Sean Eudaily, Nicole Galiger, Sara Glasgow, Jonathon Griffiths,

Sunny Kaniyathu, Mark Lowman, Tate Nurkin, Triona O'Conner, Gene Parker,

Danielle Phillips, Steve Smith, and Hong Wills.

Return to the COV&R '99 Schedule