Foundational Possibilities for Reinventing Culture
By
Tom Flores
The Graduate Theological Union
Background
Mainly drawing upon his work, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, René Girard posits that Christianity, at its most fundamental level, inherited and utilized a violently encoded (human) "sacrificial" or "scapegoat" mechanism into its very fabric, and that a "victimage mechanism" mythologized and concealed the truth about history's sacrificial victims. The record of the Gospels, particularly the Crucifixion, serve as the central event in literature / history which serve to "unmask" and "reveal" the falsity of the victimage mechanism on an unparalleled level. Alluding to the anthropological significance of the Cross, Girard asserts that "the powers of murder and evil have been brought out into the open and reduced to silence at the crucifixion." Christ, the Universal Victim has demystified the "God of Violence." Girard relies heavily upon Luke 11, (i.e., "the stone the builders rejected has become the chief cornerstone") to assert that it is Christ (as the rejected "cornerstone") who uproots the structural matrix of all sacrificial understandings of religion. Furthermore, Matt. 5:43-45 suggests a refusal of all violence and all its works.
Girard concludes that through the Person and work of Jesus Christ, the
Gospels and the New Testament reveal emphatically the root of violent mechanisms,
and offer keys to establishing new peaceful, non-rivalrous and non-violent
mechanisms. His hermeneutical framework for developing a new cultural order
rests upon a reinterpretation of the Gospels and the role that collective
violence plays in human culture. Girard's prescription suggests that in
order for Christians to move toward renunciation of that role, it is necessary
to relinquish the idea of retribution (i.e., "legitimate reprisals" or
"initiated forms of violence") in order to transcend the "natural morality"
of humankind.(1)One might conclude that Girard's
unique perspective serves as both a strong internal critique of and a resounding
affirmation of the Christian message.
Central Claim
However, as enlightening and useful as Girard's application to
the New Testament texts may be, and if one is to incorporate his "victimage
anthropology" into a broader ontological theology, one must at least be
cognizant of a potential difficulty with regard to Girard's scapegoat theory
before doing so. It is my opinion that the requisites for Girard's victimary
anthropology (i.e., mimesis, sacrifice and the "necessary misunderstanding"
as part of his "theological superstructure"), at least as he enumerates
them in his various works, are anthropological or historical necessities,
not ontological necessities. His "necessary misunderstanding" works as
a type of victimary "social contract" theory. The theological question
is this: if Girard's "misunderstandings" are ontologically necessary (at
least from the starting point of the "founding murder"), then we severely
neglect or negate human agency. If they are unnecessary (which Girard doesn't
seem to specify), then they are simply historical constructs. If this is
so, then why did humans enact and cling to them? Was / is it purely
mimesis? Is mimesis "corrupted" by sin? Is the victimage mechanism an inevitable
consequence of mimetic rivalry as Girard suggests? Is humankind by its
own capacity, capable of Christ-like mimesis? This is where I believe
Girard's hermeneutic encounters its limits with regard to a Christian interpretation
of a victimary anthropology and a theologically-based reformulation of
human relations. These kind of limits are inevitable if one treats religion
as simply an empirical phenomenon.
The principle of relational ontology and perichoresis (as derived from Trinitarian inter-relation) gives rise to the perichoretic model which suggests that the links which bind humans together in society are first and foremost, reflected in the Persons of the Trinity and reveal constructs upon which new models of society and social solidarity can be built. Furthermore, the perichoretic model clarifies an ontological aspect of "the human person" which is grounded both in historical and a-historical relationality, a relationality which bears upon "the truth of the victim."
We utilize David Tracy's understanding of systematic theology which
describes systematic theology as "a mutually critical correlation between
an interpretation of the Christ event and an interpretation of the contemporary
situation."(2) As an interpreter of the contemporary
situation (as well as the past), René Girard offers principles or
parameters for a revised (victimary) anthropology (based upon the secular
study of the role of religion in the contemporary situation and the past).
To represent an interpretation of the Christ event (i.e., the full revelation
of Christ in Spirit, Scripture, history and Resurrection), we turn primarily
to Catherine LaCugna, Leonardo Boff and the recovery of the role of perichoresis
in the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity. We use perichoresis to develop
principles for a revised theological anthropology which makes relationality
fundamental to human ontology, more fundamental, even, than "sacred violence."
A relational ontology understands both God and the creature to exist and meet as persons in communion. The economy of creation, salvation, and consummation is the place of encounter in which God and the creature exist together in one mystery of communion and interdependence. The meaning of to-be is to-be-a-person-in-communion. This relational ontology follows from the fundamental unity of oikonomia and theologia;
God's To-Be is To-Be-in-relationship, and God's being-in-relationship-to-us
is what God is. A relational ontology focuses on personhood, relationship,
and communion as the modality of all existence.(3)
The idea of perichoresis emerged as a substitute for the earlier
patristic notion that the unity of God belonged to the person of God the
Father. When the doctrine of the Father's monarchy was attenuated by the
Cappadocian doctrine of intradivine relations, the idea of perichoresis
took its place. Effective as a defense both against tritheism and Arian
subordinationism, perichoresis expressed the idea that the three divine
persons mutually inhere in one another, draw life from one another, 'are'
what they are by relation to one another.(4)
Liberation theologian Leonardo Boff adds to this by stating that the Greek term perichoresis (Latin: circumincessio) used by the Cappadocian theologians and St. John of Damascene, was a technical term for expressing "'the intimate and perfect inhabitation of one Person in the other.' The Three divine Persons are reciprocally inter-penetrating."(5) We also observe the etymology of the word closely related to the word "to dance" (i.e., "perichoreo" which signifies "cyclical movement or reoccurance"). Here, both LaCugna and Boff convey a meaning of a "divine dance" comprised of interaction and intercourse of fluid motion of encircling, encompassing, enveloping and outstretching. This includes a complete circulation and perfect co-equality between the Persons, without any anteriority or superiority of one over the other.(6)
Catherine LaCugna defines perichoresis as "being-in-one-another,
permeation without confusion. No person exists by him / herself or is referred
to him / herself; this would produce number and therefore division within
God. Rather to be a divine person is to be by nature in relation
to other persons."(7) We notice two aspects of this
definition: permeation without confusion, and divine "person" by nature,
as relational. As we shall see, these aspects carry immediate implications
for human conceptions of personhood vis à vis the victimage / scapegoat
mentality.
The characteristics of genuine communion (he prefers the term communing')
are presence of one to another, reciprocity (connaturality), and immediacy.
The result is community: unity amidst diversity, utopia, freedom from conflicts
and barriers, the achievement of the common good. Boff makes his ontology
explicit: Communion requires being-in-openness (freedom), being-in-transcendence
(ecstasis), and being-us (the new ontological reality created by persons
in communion). God, Boff says is the supreme and infinite exemplification
of all these characteristics. God is 'absolute openness, supreme presence,
total immediacy, eternal transcendence and infinite communion.' To say
that God is communion is to define what God is: 'Three persons and a single
communion and a single trinitarian community: this is the best formula
to represent the Christian God.'(8)
Boff's "communitarian" model of the Trinity (and society) is premised upon his relational ontology. "Everything in them [the Trinity] is common and communicated to one another, except what cannot be communicated: what distinguishes one from the others...This is the source of the utopia of equality - with due respect for differences - full communion and just relationships in society and history."(9) The point here is that to be God is to be in relation. And to be in relation is to be in and create community.
Boff then translates the communitarian model of the Trinity to a human anthropology of societal relations. He states that
the Trinity serves as a model for an integrated society. In God,
each person acts in consonance with its distinctive personality, yet the
activity is common to all three. The trinitarian interplay of perfect perichoresis
displays co-existence between personal and social, between the happiness
of each and the well-being of all. These relationships underlie all community
and social life and are enlightened and inspired by the communion of the
Trinity.(10)
What we see here is a portrait of Boff's "integrated society" of persons. Trinitarian life exemplifies coexistence between and among equals working together for the common good of all, the well-being of all. We take notice of Boff's descriptions of a "utopia of equality," with "due respect for differences." The portrait that Boff offers points to what he regards as the essential attributes of the human person: "immediacy," "reciprocity" and "relationship."
LaCugna's discussion of Boff's "integrated societal" notion of the human person and reciprocal and equal relationships may be complemented by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger's conception of "person" as what he terms the "wholly other" or theological "we." Ratzinger clarifies what he means by "wholly other:"
We may accordingly say: The other through which the spirit comes
to itself is finally that wholly other for which we use the stammering
word 'God.' If this is true, then what was said above can be further clarified
in the horizon of faith and we may say: If the human person is all the
more with itself, and is itself, the more it is able to reach beyond itself,
the more it is with the other, then the person is all the more itself the
more it is with the wholly other, with God. In other words, the spirit
comes to itself in the other, it becomes completely itself the more it
is with the other....The human person is the event or being of relativity.
The more the person's relativity aims totally and directly at its final
goal, at transcendence, the more the person is itself.(11)
With regard to the "theological we," Ratzinger is clear to point
out that this concept of the "wholly other" is not simply a dialogical
form of Martin Buber's "I / thou" relationship. "Even God is not a simple
'I,' "but the 'we' of Father, Son, and Spirit. On
both sides there
is neither the pure 'I,' nor the pure 'you,' but on both sides the 'I'
is integrated into the greater 'we.'"(12) It is important
to stress that for Ratzinger, this Trinitarian "we" is the human "we,"
not simply a one-sided "I and Thou." In this sense, Ratzinger echoes Boff's
sentiments that "Christianity, which is a trinitarian faith, has as a matter
of principle given the same dignity to multiplicity as to unity." Indeed,
it "considers multiplicity as belonging to unity with the same dignity."(13)
What is significant and impressive about this eight-fold understanding of personhood is its theological and ontological breadth. When referring to 1) persons are essentially interpersonal, intersubjective; and 2) a person is an ineffable, concrete, unique, and unrepeatable ecstasis of nature; LaCugna speaks of the "ineffable, unrepeatable" quality of the human being. She is referring to the "inexhaustible mystery that is not fully communicated to another" which is a "concrete" identity, but "not self-enclosed."(15) Her assertion that 3) the person is the foundation of nature is quite profound as it attempts to link the actualization of the human person to all aspects of both earthly and divine relationality. That is to say, that what is most "natural" is that which "brings about the full realization of persons as well as the communion of persons with one another." What is also most "natural" is that which corresponds most fully to right relationship at all levels: "we to others, to the earth, to God, to ourselves."(16)
With regard to 4) the freedom of the deified human being consists in being free-for, free-toward others, poised in the balance between self-possession and other-orientation, it is important to note that she understands this as a freedom to "both self-possession" and "other-orientation." Leonardo Boff would enthusiastically agree with LaCugna's declaration that this freedom must include "freedom from fear, compulsions and obsessions, from the need either to dominate or to be dominated," as well as freedom "from the cycle of violence."(17) With regard to 5) being catholic in two respects, we note that this is related to the principle of 3) person is the foundation of nature. For LaCugna, the aspect of "being catholic" involves an inclusiveness of everything that exists. Personhood becomes a "bridge between ourselves and everything and everyone else, past, present and future." The second aspect reflects a totality of nature that each person uniquely exemplifies in what it means to be a human. For LaCugna, "the ultimate norm and archetype of human personhood [and catholicity] is Jesus Christ."(18)
When we note that 6) the achievement of personhood requires
ascesis, we are asserting LaCugna's contention that "all of us exist
in the tension of sin and grace, as creatures in the process of being divinized."
In this sense, LaCugna asserts that conforming to one's personhood "requires
discipline, the putting to death in ourselves all those practices that
confine us to biological existence and lead us to death."(19)
And lastly, with regard to 7) person is an exponential concept;
and 8) living as persons in communion, in right relationship, is the
meaning of salvation and the ideal of Christian faith, we encounter
LaCugna's powerful correlations of Trinitarian relatedness. She states
that in each new relationship we (as humans) "are" in a new way, "exist"
in a new way, indeed, we "have our being from another." She states that
while "the network of human personhood is limited," we see that to God
belongs the sphere of "infinite relatedness," and "infinite capacity for
relationship."(20) This process reflects the notion
that we are created in the image of a "relational God and are gradually
being perfected in that image." For LaCugna, this process (i.e., living
as persons in communion, in right relationship ) can be summed
up in the term theosis.(21) Furthermore, this
Trinitarian portrait of personhood cannot be separated into two sets of
communion, one among the divine persons and another among human persons,
"with the latter supposed to replicate the former." Rather, this portrait
represents the one perichoresis, the one mystery of communion
which "includes God and humanity as beloved partners in the dance."(22)
We now attempt to correlate our discussion of relational ontology,
perichoresis and Trinitarian conceptions of personhood (or Trinity as a
basis for solidarity with the human person) with general principles and
anthropological constructs of the victimage mechanism extracted from Girard's
work. In his various works, René Girard clearly articulates the
links which bind communities and societies together (from their inception)
as stemming from mimetic desire and rivalry, as well as pervasive sacrificial
attempts to rectify the inevitable conflicts which ensue from mimetic desire
and rivalry. As stated at the outset, René Girard affirms the power
and truth of the Gospels to "unmask and reveal the falsity of the victimage
mechanism." However, we incorporate relational ontology, perichoresis and
Trinitarian conceptions of personhood (i.e., LaCugna's "theosis") to lend
theological basis for Girard's insistence on the need to establish social
harmony without sacrificial mechanisms.
However, more specifically, this particular theological basis (the Trinity) gives us a unique and unparalleled model of diverse "Persons" in communal and social harmony without mimetic rivalry; of peaceful co-existence without domination and objectification of "victims". We may not be able to assert however that there is no sacrificial quality to Trinitarian and perichoretic relations given the history of Christian revelation and salvation. However, as far as we know, this "sacrificial quality" was not / is not "corrupted" by deformed desire, mimetic rivalry, domination and surrogate displacement. We therefore assert that the Trinitarian model as a real analogy and metaphor for human relations is indeed a legitimate theological and anthropological construct. In fact, Leonardo Boff explains, "a renewal of trinitarian thought is taking place now on the basis of reflection, still in its infancy, but very serious, on the links that bind women and men together in community and society - links that also involve Persons of the Trinity."(23) The "integrated society" based upon the Trinitarian model which Boff speaks of give to us the foundations of communal harmony which involve equality, participation, invitation and consensus which are antithetical to the victimage mechanism. In the victimage society, human solidarity and communal harmony are generated by the expulsion of the designated victim. In that society humans are not equals in that surrogate victims are unanimously chosen against their will to become the receptacle of the community's transferred violence. In that society full participation is limited so that marginalized individuals or groups are always readily available to be targeted for collective blame and violence. In what follows, I will make four assertions which establish what I believe to be mutually critical correlations between Girard's victimary premises and perichoretic Trinitarian theology. These correlations could be understood to be "positive" in that they theologically affirm Girard's excoriation of the distorted sacrificial mentality which gives rise to and perpetuates a victimary anthropology.
1). First, a perichoretic understanding rejects and negates the twin precepts of the sacrificial mentality which asserts a) that humans must die in order for communal harmony to thrive, and b) that somehow God requires or delights in the sacrifice or oppression of certain "designated" humans. God cannot demand the violent murder of that which is ontologically inter-permeated with God's very being (LaCugna's notion of human "infinite relatedness to God"). In perichoretic thinking, humans are never viewed as functionary.
2). Secondly, in revisiting Ratzinger's theological "we," humans cannot ontologically disconnect or dissociate themselves from other humans (i.e., potential sacrificial "targets" to be used as scapegoats). The "I" is integrated into the greater "we." The perichoretic understanding of personhood states that to be a human person is to be by nature relational. That relational connection of "being-in-one-another" and a "turning towards the other" is related to the claim that the more persons are able to reach beyond themselves, the more persons are "all the more themselves." This perichoretic understanding correspondingly negates and rejects the second "necessary misunderstanding" excoriated by Girard that communal or cultural harmony must be achieved at the expense of innocent human beings. We are by nature "in" and part of one another. Therefore, a perichoretic understanding vis à vis a scapegoat mentality asserts that to disconnect or withdraw our identification, compassion, solidarity, and advocacy from any human being or group is to disconnect or deny the very foundations of our own humanity. When we do so, we violate the very definition of what it means to be a human person.
3). Thirdly, we note the concept of mimetic rivalry in Girard's theory. We assert that Jesus Christ was free from acquisitive mimetic behavior. Jesus sought no human glory, power or prestige. Jesus' only mimetic desire (and behavior) was to imitate God the Father.(24) We enlist several New Testament passages which discourage acquisitive mimetic desire and instead admonish agape love; indeed self-less desire (Gal 5:26; Phil 2:3-5). The perichoretic notion of personhood affirms and demonstrates this premise on an ontological level. The Trinitarian model as we have presented it, and all human anthropologies derived from it, are by nature and definition "other-oriented" and "reciprocal."
We have stated that the very "substance" of the human person is "other-oriented." For Boff, this means "communal-oriented." We asserted that the perichoretic understanding dictates that there is no pure "I" separate from a pure "you" just as there is no "pure" God who is separate from creation. A perichoretic understanding of persons believes that "the freedom of the deified human being consists in being free-for, free-toward others, poised in the balance between self-possession and other-orientation." This includes being free from the need either to dominate or be dominated and free from a cycle of violence.
It is worth reflecting more deeply upon LaCugna's perichoretic concept of the human person "poised in the balance between self-possession and other orientation" in relation to the Trinity and Girard's mimetic principles. It has been brought to this writer's attention that this attempted balance is delicate because 1) "the self can never be possesed, only received," and 2) that number one is true because our "ontology," our "being" is "other-oriented." The problem with human fallenness is that because our desires fall into mimetic rivalry, we cannot "receive ourselves from each other." In fact, perhaps our fallenness acts itself out in trying to possess the other. There is the delusional expectation that if we can possess the Other, we can possess our Self. "Self-possession is thus an illusion in that the more we try to possess the Other, the more we find that the Other possesses us."
Relating this to the Trinity, God is the only free Self, but the Divine nature shows us no attempts as possession whatsoever. In the Trinity, we observe a mutual self-giving, not self-possession. From a perichoretic human perspective, "it is in our completely giving ourselves over to the (Three-in-) One who gives Himself over to us, that we can truly receive our self as pure grace."(25) A perichoretic notion of personhood then, by virtue of its other-orientation teaches an alternative to acquisitive mimetic rivalry and rejects the cycle of violence which "naturally" ensues from mimetic rivalry.
4). Fourthly, a perichoretic notion of personhood and relationality affirms human dignity and justice. No one has communicated this more emphatically than Leonardo Boff in his analysis and critique of Trinitarian theology. Boff grounds economia and theologia in the historicity of God's salvific work through the Incarnation of the Son and work of the Spirit. This Trinitarian action is unified in and through the historical experiences of humans and demonstrates a liberative quality.(26)
Thus, for Boff, there is a strong historical component to his concept of perichoresis. In general, he believes that "the Trinity seeks to see itself reflected in history, through people sharing their goods in common, building up of egalitarian and just relationships among all, sharing what they are and what they have."(27) This statement captures the essence of Boff's conviction vis à vis the social justice / dignity-affirming aspect of perichoresis. However, Boff's convictions are much stronger than just "ideal" utopian wishes or dreams. He envisions a Trinitarian anthropology which can actually be felt and experienced in our own historical reality. This reality for Boff, and that which should be practiced by all people, especially Christians, must be consistent with Trinitarian reality. Boff lucidly explains,
Trinitarian communion is a source of inspiration rather than of
criticism of the social sphere....In the Trinity there is no domination
by one side, but convergence of the Three in mutual acceptance and giving....Therefore,
a society that takes its inspiration from trinitarian communion cannot
tolerate class differences, dominations based on power (economic, sexual,
or ideological) that subjects those who are different to those who exercise
power and marginalizes the former from the latter....Only a society of
sisters and brothers whose social fabric is woven out of participation
and communion of all in everything can justifiably claim to be an image
and likeness (albeit pale) of the Trinity, the foundation and final resting-place
of the universe.(28)
Here it is important to note that Boff is speaking primarily of a Christian community but not exclusively so. What is relevant here is Boff's conception of the term "social fabric." In fact, the very characteristics of "community" which we have ascribed to Boff characterize a Trinitarian "social fabric." Therefore, from Boff's perspective, it may be stated that the perichoretic conception of social fabric is made possible and foundational by human "participation and communion by all." These two components include all of the above mentioned social justice aspects. These are not additional but integral to a perichoretic conception of participation and communion.
Before we move to the final correlations, it may be of some use
to locate the previous four perichoretic correlations within a categorized
frame of reference. The first correlation may be aptly categorized as a
"God-to-Human," "Human-to-God" relationship. The second correlation as
a "Human-to-Him/Herself" relationship. The third correlation as a "Human-to-Society"
relationship. And the forth correlation as a "Human-to-Human" "global /
historical" relationship. What we notice then is a starting point of the
closest proximity; God-to-human and human-to-God. From there we are brought
back to the intra-personal, then inter-personal emanating progressively
outward in a horizontal axis. This also symbolizes and / or corresponds
to the symbolic circular, encompassing nature of perichoresis itself.
The social justice characteristics of the perichoretic notion of
personhood indicate that powers of domination, whether based upon power,
sex, economy or ideology, are antithetical to the very foundations of communal
being. Theoretically these foundations are and should be based in daily
reality and relationality. These should be the foundations by which human
history and cultural formations progress. If this were the case, the mythical
power of communal / societal reconciliation based upon restorative or "sacred"
violence would never flourish. Societal relations would reflect and affirm
the justice and dignity of all persons and therefore reject the need to
mythologize in sacred manner violence directed at any human person. In
other words, the delusion of sacred violence would be disarmed to reflect
the realized truths of the inherent dignity of all human persons. Furthermore,
the communal sense of justice would not include collective murder either
as a means to prevent discord or a means of retribution. But rather, a
perichoretic sense of "communal justice" would reflect and engage in collective
solidarity, compassion and fairness. The perichoretic understanding
of the foundations of social fabric then negates and emphatically rejects
the mythologized and commemorative power of the surrogate victim. It also
negates and rejects the victimage system's utilization of collective murder
as an expression of communal or societal "justice" or "divine" retribution.
The perichoretic understanding of differentiation and unity conjures up a sense of what Elizabeth Johnson has called "radical equality" as mirrored in the symbol of the Trinity. Persons never lose their sense of personal distinctiveness in relations. In fact, relations not only bond persons but establish them in personal uniqueness.(31) Although always in search of the unity of God, a perichoretic understanding affirms the uniqueness of individuals and enlists the ontological reality of the Trinity as strong reason not to blur human distinctions.
René Girard warns against the blurring of human distinctions but for markedly different reasons. He asserts the absolute necessity of physical and societal human distinctions as "protective [cultural] facades of society." For Girard, these distinctions are crucial for all order (natural and cultural), and it is the loss of them rather than the distinctions themselves which "give rise to violence and chaos." This ethos of non-differentiation "forces men into perpetual confrontation," strips them of their distinctive characteristics," and threatens a "muddy mass of undifferentiated floodtide."(32) The greater the ethos of non-differentiation, the greater the potential for the intensification of uncontrolled violence. Girard attributes this phenomenon to the premise that in the absence of differentiation antagonists can truly and most easily become "monstrous doubles."(33)
The perichoretic conception of "differentiation" however rejects
Girard's rationale for the necessity of preserving human distinctions and
differences. To clarify this statement, we first want to emphasize
and restate here that the perichoretic understanding of "difference" premised
upon the model or analogy of the Trinity affirms and recognizes difference,
uniqueness, multiplicity and enlists the ontological reality of the Trinity
as strong reason not to blur human distinctions. The perichoretic
principle recognizes and affirms the necessity and reality of "difference."
However, it is Girard's
rational for preserving and maintaining
difference within social structure that is rejected,
not difference
itself. The perichoretic notion of diversity is not threatened by what
may be termed as the "blurring of human distinctions." The perichoretic
notion understands that though humans may share physical, ethnic, religious
or ideological similarities, sometimes to the extreme, all persons are
unique, ineffable and irreplaceable. The bonds of human relationship are
not predicated upon external human differentiations. In other words,
human solidarity is ontological, rather than situational or volitional
(i.e., adherence to cultural "facades" of distinction or differentiation).
In Christian love, unity and differentiation are correlates rather than
opposites of each other.(34)
From a faith perspective, Jesus was perichoresis in action.
His example urges and
challenges us to live perichoresis.
In doing so, we may come to the realization that we are to neither venerate
nor despise the scapegoat, but to eliminate the need for him altogether!
We do well to keep in mind that through his very life and example, Jesus
who is the Scapegoat par excellence, is the champion of all
scapegoats and innocent victims. We must remind ourselves of His very words,
"whatever you do to the least of these you do unto me." Finally, a revised
theological anthropology (based on a critical, faith-filled study of the
doctrine of the Trinity as an interpretation of the Christ event) can provide
moral, philosophical and theological understanding to the notion which
Girard's Christian hermeneutic so resoundingly highlights: that it is "the
rejected cornerstone" who uproots the structural matrix of all sacrificial
understandings of religion. This "chief cornerstone" who bids us to "do
unto me" invites us all to help rebuild a different kind of cultural edifice,
one whose altars do not require "sacred violence" nor "necessary misunderstandings,"
but a renewed mind, capable of seeing what He saw, the truth of the human
person.
2. 2 The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism, (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1985), 175. Cf. also "The Foundations of Practical Theology," in Practical Theology: The Emerging Field in Theology, Church and World, Don S. Browning ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 61-82.
3. 3 God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), 250. Emphasis in original. In the most basic terms, oikonomia refers to God's self-communication or "economy;" the three "faces" or manifestations of God's activity in the world, correlated with the names Father, Son and Spirit. Theologia refers to the life and work of God in the economy; God's "essence" or "inner-being." However, see pp. 209-305 for a broader explication. Also, it may be wise to address two issues at this juncture. First, one may have problems with a conception of relational ontology which asserts that "Gods-To-Be is To-Be in relationship, and God's being in relationship to us is what God is," and that "personhood, relationship and communion" is the "modality of all existence." The "problem" is related to economia and theologia. One may interpret that by these criteria, we are asserting that these communicative "manifestations" are necessary for God to be God. If they are necessary conditions, we severely limit God's freedom. We know only what God chooses to self-communicate. We cannot know the rest. This writer is not claiming this as a necessity of God's being. The ancient economia / theologia debate continues. Secondly, one may interpret the language of relational ontology and perichoresis (i.e., "all creation permeated by and permeates God's presence") to convey a type of "pantheism." A more accurate label may indeed be "panentheism." In pantheism, God is identified with the world and the world identifies God. In panentheism, "God is not identified with the world, but everything and everyone in the world exist in God....the world in God and God in the world means that all creation is in the arena of divine incarnation." See Paul Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1985), 189.
4. 4 Ibid., 270. However, my most gracious thanks and acknowledgement of Alice Carter of the University of Massechusetts at Boston, for bringing to my attention the difference between LaCugna's presentation of perichoresis and an Orthodox interpretation. In a letter to this writer (6/15/99) she states that "the Orthodox interpretation is always rooted in the Biblical and Ecclesial experience of the Holy Trinity. There is no independent exploration of the activity of the Trinity which excludes those two realities. The Orthodox writers' interpretations (of the Trinity) are also rooted in the Church itself, and the scriptures it wrote. How we know each Person is in the historical experience of the Church, beginning with Isreal." To exemplify the point, she aptly quotes from the Orthodox theologian Christos Yannaras: "The God of the Church is the God of historical experience, not the God of theoretical assumptions and abstract syllogisms. Precisely this experience of the Church confirms that the God who is revealed in history is not a solitary existence, an autonomous monad or individual essence. He is a Trinity of hypostasis, three persons with absolute existential difference, but as well a community of essence, will and activity." Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 20.
5. 5 trans. Paul Burns., Trinity and Society, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), 83-84. Scriptural references for this concept are found in John 10:38; 14:11; 17:21.
6. 6 See Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, (New York: Crossroads, 1992), 220. Cf also God for Us, pp. 271-272, and Trinity and Society, 93.
7. 7 God For Us, 271. Emphasis in original.
8. 8 God For Us, cited on p. 275. However, see Trinity and Society, pp. 105-147 for deeper explication along with a critique of Barth and Rahner's Trinitarian axioms.
9. 9 Trinity and Society, 93. Again, my thanks to Alice Carter who brought to my attention the close parallel between Boff's historical emphasis of the Trinity and Orthodox theological conceptions as well. For example, Christos Yannaras eloquently states "[t]he Holy Spirit effects in history the revelation of the Word of God, the incarnation of the Person of the Word, and the formation of the Body of the Person of the Word (which is the Church). All these are events giving life to what is created, events with final reference to the Person of the Father, the image and manifestation of whom is the Son and Word. In his revelation through the Word within creation, within history, and from within the texts of Scripture, God is confirmed as Father of every personal existence which will accept adoption, will agree to realize the same relationship of life with God which the Son has with the Father. But the relationship of adoption is the work of the Spirit, his own procession from the Father establishes sonship as a lifegiving relatiohsip for every existent." Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology, 33.
11. 11 "Concerning the notion of the human person in theology," Communio: International Catholic Review, vol. 17 no. 3, Fall (1993), 451-52. Premised upon a Christology, Ratzinger does qualify this premise (regarding human personhood) with the caution that "being-with-the-other does not cancel his being-with-himself, but brings it fully to itself."
12. 12 Ibid., 453. Emphasis in original. Ratzinger also makes clear that in his theological concept of "person," not even God can be seen as the pure and simple "I" which the human person tends.
13. 13 Ibid., 453. Mention has been made of Buber's "I / thou" metaphor. Nicholas Lash does an excellent job of explicating this concept in relation to the "I / It" world of Ego and relationality. See Easter in Ordinary, 178-198. Cf. God For Us, 256-59.
14. 14 God For Us, 288-292. For LaCugna, this "eightfold portrait of personhood" represents an amalgam of sorts or synthesis of thought after having analyzed the insights of a towering list of thinkers and theologians. These partially include the Cappadocians, Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, Rahner, Rosseau, Macmurray, Moltmann, Boff, Farely, Wilson-Kastner and Zizioulas.
22. 22 Ibid., 274. Emphasis in original.
23. 23 Trinity and Society, 118-119.
24. 24 See Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence: Paul's Hermeneutic of the Cross, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). On the other hand, we must keep in mind that Scripture tells us that "he was tempted as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4:15). Therefore, in contrast to Hamerton-Kelly, we may indeed say that Jesus did not exhibit acquistive mimetic behavior. But He may have been tempted toward acquisitive mimetic desire.
25. 25 My most gracious and heartfelt thanks to the Reverend Paul Nuechterlein of Emmaus Lutheran Church in Racine, Wisconsin, who in his reflection of the relationship between the "balance between self-possession and other-orientation," and Girard's mimetic principles, so eloquently and thoughtfully conveyed these words and insights to me in a letter dated 6/4/99. Thank you Paul for your contribution.
26. 26 See Trinity and Society, 123-188.
29. 29 Ibid., 139-140. These "irreducible differences" do not mean "pure and simple separation" because it is the Trinitarian diversity "that enables their communion, reciprocity and mutual revelation to come about."
31. 31 She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, ( New York: Crossroads, 1992), 218-223. These pages nicely expound on the concept of "radical equality" derived from Trinitarian mutual interrelatedness.